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SECTION 8(b)(1)(B) AS A BAR TO THE PURSUIT OF
SELF-HELP REMEDIES BY SUPERVISORS-SOMETIMES
Supervisory personnel are accorded a special status under the
National Labor Relations Act (N.L.R.A.)' reflecting their unique
role in the continual tension between labor and management. Inter-
posed between top management and rank-and-file workers, the su-
pervisor depends primarily upon effective service as management's
representative for advancement within the company, yet often relies
upon union membership to provide job security and other benefits. 2
Congress preserved this middle ground3 as the present Act evolved
by placing supervisors in a compromised position: in the enactment
of section 14(a)4 it expressly countenanced union participation by
supervisors, providing them some of the economic benefits attend-
ant upon union membership, but recognizing the employer's need
for loyal servants, Congress significantly offset the full benefits of
such affiliation by excluding supervisors from the statutory defini-
tion of "employee," 5 denying them the right to bargain collectively.'
This restraint upon a supervisor's ability to compel collective bar-
gaining dictates that each side resort to its traditional weapons once
a dispute arises; employers may discharge supervisors who partici-
1. The Wagner Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 136
(1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1970)) comprises the National Labor Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970).
2. See generally Comment, The Role of Supervisors in Employee Unions, 40 U. CHr. L. Rv.
185-86 (1972).
3. The Act provides: "The term 'supervisor' means any individual having authority, in the
interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign,
reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their
grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the
exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of
independent judgment." 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1970)..
4. Section 14(a) provides in part: "Nothing herein shall prohibit aiy individual employed
as a supervisor from becoming or remaining a member of a labor organization, but no em-
ployer subject to this subehapter shall be compelled to deem individuals defined herein as
supervisors as employees for the purpose of any law, either national or local, relating to
collective bargaining." 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1970).
5. Section 2(3) provides in part: "The term 'employee' shall include any employee, and
shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer. . . but shall not include...
any individual employed as a supervisor. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970).
6. Although the Act does not prohibit supervisors from participation in labor organizations,
an employer is not compelled to bargain with such unions concerning supervisors' employ-
ment conditions, although he may do so voluntarily. See Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HAnv. L. Ray. 1, 4-5 (1947); Note, Union Discipline of
Supervisors: Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 14 WM. & MARY L. REv. 674, 677-78 (1973); Com-
ment, The Role of Supervisors in Employee Unions, 40 U. Cm. L. Ray. 185, 187 (1972).
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pate in union activities with or without cause,7 while supervisors
may turn to various "self-help" remedies8 in an attempt to elicit
concessions from the employer.
Moreover, some applications of the N.L.R.A. have foreclosed even
resort to self-help by supervisors while they maintain current mem-
bership in a statutory labor organization. Mixed unions, comprising
both supervisory personnel and statutory employees, clearly are
labor organizations within the purview of section 2(5) of the Act9 by
virtue of their constituent employee element.10 Attempts by
supervisor members to regain lost jobs have been construed, there-
fore, by some courts to constitute a violation by the union of section
8(b) (1)(B) which forbids any statutory labor organization from
coercing an employer-to appoint or remove a particular bargaining
or grievance representative. 1 Although other decisions have evinced
reluctance to broaden the sweep of the Act so readily,1 2 no uniformly-
applied test exists to govern the application of section 8(b) (1) (B) to
supervisors and their organizations.
7. An employer may discharge an employee only for cause if the employee's actions are
within the general ambit of labor activities. See, e.g., NLRB v Electrical Workers Local 1229,
346 U.S. 464 (1953) (disloyalty as cause for dismissal). See also Getman, The Protection of
Economic Pressure by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 115 U. PA. L. Pav. 1195,
1211-18 (1967).
8. Except where delimited or proscribed by legislation, self-help remedies, primarily strikes
in the case of employees, remain a vital force in labor-management relations. In the analogous
case of railway workers, who, like supervisors, are excluded from the coverage of the N.L.R.A.,
the Supreme Court has recognized the validity of self-help activity upon the exhaustion of
remedies provided by the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577, 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1970). See
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369 (1969); Brother-
hood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 372 U.S. 284 (1963); Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v.
Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 725 (1945).
9. Section 2(5) provides: "The term 'labor organization' means any organization of any
kind . . .in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in
part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay,
hours of employment, or conditions of work." 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1970).
10. See, e.g., NLRB v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 169 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1948), cert.
denied, 335 U.S. 908 (1949); NLRB v. American Furnace Co., 158 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1946);
NLRB v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 156 F.2d 706 (3d Cir. 1946).
11. See International Org. of Masters, Mates & Pilots v. NLRB, 486 F.2d 1271 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 1970 (1974); International Org. of Masters, Mates & Pilots v.
NLRB, 351 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 1965); National Marine Eng'rs' Beneficial Ass'n v. NLRB,
274 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1960).
Section 8(b)(1)(B) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
or its agents. ., to restrain or coerce . . .an employer in the selection of his representatives
for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances . . . ." 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(1)(B) (1970).
12. See notes 39, 53-60 infra & accompanying text.
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Identification of the interests intended to be protected by that
section and an examination of cases applying the N.L.R.A. to non-
statutory employees will indicate the concerns that should be ad-
dressed in the application of section 8(b)(1)(B) to supervisor self-
help remedies. Reference to the mode of analysis approved by the
Supreme Court in cases involving union discipline of supervisors"3
will suggest an approach that may provide guidance for determining
when section 8(b)(1)(B) should be invoked to bar otherwise permis-
sible resort to self-help remedies by supervisors.
Protected Interests Under Section 8(b)(1)(B)
The legislative history underlying the National Labor Relations
Act of 1935 evidences a congressional intent to protect the interests
of "workers" and "laborers" but is conspicuously barren of any
reference to supervisory personnel. 14 This omission from the Act's
field of protected interests was not accidental since management
traditionally had used supervisors to implement their antiunion pol-
icies. Indeed, as Professor Levinson has concluded, "[It might
seem . . . that the law had been designed to restrict the activities
of supervisors rather than to expand them."' 5
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), however, remained
unconvinced that Congress intended to exclude supervisors from the
protective -umbrella placed over workers by the Act. Within seven
years of the Act's passage, the Board, ignoring the implicit exclusion
of supervisors, ordered a representation election to determine the
bargaining status of an independent foreman's union in Union Colli-
eries Coal Co.' With the gates thus opened, a series of Board deci-
sions extending coverage of the Act to organized supervisors in
mixed unions followed." This expansive trend culminated in 1947
with Packard Motor Co: v. NLRB18 in which the Supreme Court
13. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Electrical Workers Local 641, 94 S. Ct. 2737 (1974).
14. See 79 CONG. REC. 2371 (1935) (remarks of Senator Wagner), in 1 LEGSiLATIVE HiSToRY
oF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELArlONs Acr, 1935, at 1311 (N.L.M.B. 1949) [hereinafter cited as
HISTORY OF TH N.L.R.A.]; H.R REP. No. 969, 74th Cong., 1st SEss. (1935), in 2 HisTORY OF
THE N.L.R.A. 2910; H.R. REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), in 2 HMSTOR OF HE
N.L.R.A. 3046. See also Levinson, Foremen's Unions and the Law, 1950 Wis. L. Rav. 79.
15. Levinson, supra note 14, at 79.
16. 41 N.L.R.B. 961, 10 L.R.R.M. 140 (1942).
17. Godchaux Sugars, Inc. 44 N.L.R.B. 874, 11 L.R.R.M. 122 (1942), Harmony Short Line
Motor Transp. Co., 42 N.L.R.B. 757, 10 L.RR.M. 201 (1942). ButseeMarylandDrydock Co.,
49 N.L.R.B. 733, 12 L.R.R.M. 126 (1943).
18. 330 U.S. 485 (1947), aff'g 157 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1946), enforcing 64 N.L.R.B. 1212, 17
L.RR.M. 163 (1945). Mr. Justice Douglas, however, filed a strong dissent in which he argued
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upheld another Board determination that supervisors were entitled
to protection under the Act.
Responding in part to the Packard decision, 9 Congress reversed
this trend later in 1947 by excluding supervisors unequivocally from
the definition of "employee" placed in the Taft-Hartley amend-
ments2 1 to the N.L.R.A. Review of Senator Taft's remarks" and the
committee reports22 indicates that Congress deemed guaranteeing
employers a supply of supervisory personnel as loyal agents for the
adjustment of employee grievances to be more important than
granting supervisors the right to bargain collectively. Consonant
with its intent to protect the interests of management, as well as the
interests of employees, Congress enacted section 8(b)(1)(B) to pro-
hibit unions from pressuring management concerning its selection
of representatives for bargaining or grievance adjustment, 2 posi-
that the majority's holding was inconsistent with the clear intent of Congress. He concluded
that the "failure of Congress to formulate a policy respecting the peculiar and special prob-
lems of foremen suggests an absence of purpose to bring them under the Act. . . . "Id. at
498. Furthermore, he argued: "[W]hen Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act
in 1935, it was legislation against the activities of foremen, not on their behalf. . . .Foremen
were instrumentalities of. . .industrial policies. They blocked the wage earners' path to fair
collective bargaining. To say twelve years later that foremen were treated as the victims of
that anti-labor policy seems to me a distortion of history." Id. at 499.
19. The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare noted the impact of Packard in
its report on the Taft-Hartley Bill, stating: "A recent development which probably more than
any other single factor has upset any real balance of power in the collective-bargaining process
has been the successful efforts of labor organizations to invoke the Wagner Act for covering
supervisory personnel, traditionally regarded as part of management, into organizations com-
posed of or subservient to the unions of the very men they were hired to supervise." S. REP.
No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELAToNs AcT, 1947, at 407, 409 (N.L.R.B. 1948) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
The report noted further that the Supreme Court disapproved the NLRB's definition of
supervisors as employees but upheld it absent a specific exclusion of supervisors from the
statutory definition. Id. at 410.
20. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 141-88 (1970).
21. "They may form unions if they please, or join unions, but they do not have the protec-
tion of the National Labor Relations Act ... .We tried various in-between steps, but the
general conclusion was that they must either be a part of management or a part of the
employees .. . [lt was felt that the latter course would result in the complete disruption
of discipline and productivity in the factories of the United States." 93 CONG. Rac. 3952
(1947), in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1008-09.
22. See generally H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), in 1 LEGISLATrIvE HISTORY
292; S. RsP. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. (1947), in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 407. See also
Daykin, Legal Meaning of "Supervisor" under Taft-Hartley, 13 LAB. L.J. 130, 131 (1962).
23. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1947), in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 308 (stating
Congress' objective as it relates to another section of the Act: "What the bill does is to say
. ..that no one, whether employer or employee, need have as his agent one who is obligated
to those on the other side . . ").
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tions traditionally filled at the lowest echelons by supervisory,
though nonmanagement, personnel. The Taft-Hartley amendments
did not alter the right of supervisors to join labor organizations, but
as a result of the enactment of section 8(b)(1)(B), mixed unions
could no longer bargain collectively on behalf of supervisory person-
nel as a matter of right. No doubt remained that a supervisor's only
certain recourse lay in self-help remedies when challenging his em-
ployer.
Enactment of section 8(b) (1) (B) also was designed in part to elim-
inate various tactics by which employee unions had undermined
management's autonomy in supervisor recruitment, including re-
fusals to meet with designated agents and strike threats designed
to obtain the removal of foremen unsympathetic to union needs.?
A proper interpretation of section 8(b)(1)(B), however, is possible
only by perceiving both this desire to shield management from em-
ployee pressure concerning supervisor recruitment and the explicit
exclusion of supervisors from the purview of the Act. From this dual
perspective, it can be seen that section 8(b)(1)(B) was intended to
proscribe only the efforts of "employees," as defined in section 2(3)
of the Act, to influence management's choice of foremen, and that
supervisors yet may attempt to prevail upon management in the
absence of any participation by a labor organization in a dispute
since the Act does not forbid labor protests by supervisors.
Literal Application of Section 8(b)(1)(B)
A literal reading and application of section 8(b)(1)(B) without a
concomitant appreciation of the congressional intent underlying its
enactment has, on occasion, placed an unwarranted restriction on
supervisor self-help activies. In 1973, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit exemplified the latent inequities sur-
rounding a literal interpretation of section 8(b) (1) (B) by holding in
24. 93 CONG. Ec. 3950-52 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft), in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1005.
"[E]mployees cannot say to their employer, 'We do not like Mr. X, we will not meet Mr.
X. You have to send us Mr. Y.'... It would prevent their saying to the employer, 'You have
to fire Foremen Jones. We do not like Foremen Jones, and therefore you have to fire him, or
we will not work.' . . . Under the bill the employer has a right to say, ' . . . Here is my
representative, and this is the man you have to deal with."' Id. at 3953-54, in 2 LEGIsLAT=V
HIsTORY 1012. The Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of the sponsor's state-
ments about a bill: "It is the sponsor that we look to when the meaning of the statutory words
is in doubt." Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1951). For
a concurring view of the Act's objectives, see 93 CONG. lEc. 4266 (1947) (remarks of Senator
Ellender), in 2 LEGISLATm HISTORY 1077.
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International Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots v. NLRB,2 5
that mere membership in a statutory labor organization precluded
supervisors from resorting to self-help remedies. Until March 1971,
the officers of the vessel Floridian had been hired exclusively from
the membership of International Organization of Masters, Mates &
Pilots (MM&P), a mixed union qualifying as a statutory labor or-
ganization under section 2(5) of the Act. During March of that year
the Flordian was purchased by new owners who elected to hire their
officers from the ranks of Marine Engineers Beneficial Association
(MEBA) and signed a prehire agreement with that body covering
all licensed deck officers and engineers. After a MM&P representa-
tive failed to negotiate the reinstatement of MM&P's supervisory
personnel, members of MM&P picketed the Floridian when it
docked in Miami. The International Longshoreman's Association,
an affiliated union, honored MM&P's picket lines and refused to
load the vessel. 6 Inasmuch as the picketing MM&P officers would
have been supervisory grievance adjusters if rehired,2 the court of
appeals upheld an NLRB determination that these self-help efforts
constituted coercion of an employer's selection of his grievance rep-
resentative by a labor organization in violation of section 8(b) (1) (B)
even though only supervisors participated in the picketing.2s
Such an application of section 8(b) (1) (B) leaves foremen belong-
ing to mixed unions without a right to challenge their employer's
actions since the Act does not force employers to bargain collectively
with supervisors, and any resort to self-help remedies by supervisors
will be imputed to the union, which will be deemed in violation of
the Act. Adherence to a literal interpretation of "restraint or coer-
cion" as used in section 8(b)(1)(B) not only appears unjustified in
light of that section's legislative history, but it also produces the
kind of "extraordinary result" which the Supreme Court specifically
has disapproved in construction of labor statutes.29
25. 486 F.2d 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 1970 (1974).
26. Id. at 1272-73.
27. Deck officers, such as those involved in the picketing of the Floridian, previously had
been held to be statutory supervisors. See Local 28, International Org. of Masters, Mates &
Pilots v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 376 (D.C. Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Wyandotte Transp. Co., 166 F.2d
434 (6th Cir. 1948); Wilson Transit Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 1476, 23 L.R.R.M. 1282 (1948).
28. 486 F.2d at 1273-74.
29. In NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967), the Supreme Court, dispos-
ing of an alleged 8(b)(1)(A) violation, warned of the imprecision of the words "restraint and
coercion" and stated that whenever a literal application of those words produces "extraordi-
nary results," a determination should be made "whether this meaning is confirmed in the
legislative history of the section." Id. at 184. Upon examining the legislative history of section
[Vol. 16:135
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The Court recognized in National Woodwork Manufacturers As-
sociation v. NLRB30 that although a statute "unambiguously em-
braces" the activity in question, "'a thing may be within the letter
of a statute, and yet not within the statute, because not within the
spirit nor within the intention of its makers.' "-3 Resorting therefore
to legislative history to ferret out congressional intent and finding
no evidence that Congress contemplated application of the con-
troverted section to such activity, the Court determined that
congressional silence prevented attributing to Congress an intent to
proscribe activities integral to the bargaining process even though
the statute appeared to encompass the union's actions. 2 Following
this doctrine of "negative legislative history"-" and recognizing the
importance of picketing 4 to the bargaining process, similar restraint
should be exercised in the application of section 8(b) (1) (B) to super-
visor self-held remedies when, as in Masters, Mates & Pilots, noth-
ing in the legislative history indicates that the supervisors' actions
would infringe upon an interest Congress sought to protect.
Characterizing the Status of a Mixed Union
A fundamental question in the policing of supervisors' activities
8(b)(1)(A), the Court concluded that the controverted union activity did not constitute re-
straint or coercion of the employer. Section 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1970),
addresses coercion of employees by a labor organization and thus concerns a different rela-
tionship from that involved in section 8(b)(1)(B). Nonetheless, the Court's rationale in Allis-
Chalmers provides a useful analogy for analysis of section 8(b)(1)(B).
30. 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
31. Id. at 619, quoting Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457,459 (1891). The
Court in Holy Trnity stated: "This is not the substitution of the will of the judge for that
the legislator, for frequently words of general meaning are used in a statute, words broad
enough to include an act in question, and yet a consideration of the whole legislation, or of
the circumstances surrounding its enactment, or of the absurd results which follow from
giving such broad meaning to the words, makes it unreasonable to believe that the legislator
intended to include the particular act." 143 U.S. at 459.
32. 386 U.S. at 620.
33. Id. at 649 (concurring opinion). See also NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760,
377 U.S. 58, 68-69 (1964).
34. In recognition of first amendment implications, the Supreme Court has noted that
Congress consistently exercises restraint in limiting the right to engage in peaceful picketing.
NLRB v. Teamsters Local 639, 362 U.S. 274, 284 (1960). Furthermore, the Court has refused
to ascribe "to Congress a purpose to outlaw peaceful picketing unless 'there is the clearest
indication in the legislative history' . . . that Congress intended to do so as regards the
* particular ends of the picketing under review." NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local
760, 377 U.S. 58, 63 (1964), quoting NLRB v. Teamsters Local 639, 362 U.S. 274, 284 (1960).
Applying this standard, the Court in Fruit & Vegetable Packers held that the union's con-
sumer picketing was not an unfair labor practice although it fell within the literal application
of section 8(b)(4). 377 U.S. at 71.
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is whether unions comprised of both supervisors and statutory em-
ployees are labor organizations for the purposes of the Act, since
section 8(b)(1)(B) is applicable only if the mixed union qualifies as
a statutory labor organization. Unfortunately, no authoritative
standards exist to determine the status of such a union.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit faced
an issue similar to that in Masters, Mates & Pilots more than two
decades previously in Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. v. NLRB, 31 a case
concerning a union of farmworkers, who also are excluded from the
Act's definition of "employees," 3 charged with a violation of section
8(b)(4)(A) of the Act7.3 Despite the local union's affiliation with a
national labor organization, the court of appeals held that the local
itself was not a statutory labor organization embraced by section
2(5) of the Act since none of the local's members were statutory
employees and there was no significant participation by the na-
tional union in the immediate dispute. Once the court had estab-
lished that the local was acting solely in its own interest and that
no agency relationship existed between the national and local in this
matter, it examined the makeup of the local (all farmworkers) and
ruled that it could not be considered a statutory labor organization
in view of the attempt of Congress to exclude affiliations of nonem-
ployees from the purview of the act."
A similar analysis was employed by the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in A.H. Bull Steamship Co. v. National Marine
Engineers' Beneficial Association,39 although applied in a different
35. 191 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 869 (1951).
36. Section 2(3) provides: "The term 'employee' . . . shall not include any individual
employed as an agricultural laborer. . . ." 29 U.S.C. 152(3) (1970).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(A) (1970). Section 8 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970), defines
unfair labor practices; section 8(a), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1970), identifies violations on the part
of the employer; and section 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1970), establishes violations by labor
organizations. Section 8(b)(4)(A) specifically prohibits labor organizations from engaging in
action intended to compel employers to participate in secondary boycotts. The section 2(5)
definition of labor organization, 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1970), is applicable throughout section
8.
In Di Giorgio the farm workers belonged to National Farm Labor Union Local 218, which
had combined with Teamsters Local 87 (a statutory labor organization) to demand that the
corporation enter collective bargaining. The resulting strike was attacked by the corporation
as an unfair labor practice, namely, a secondary boycott by the Teamsters encouraged by the
farm workers. The court upheld the Board's finding that the local was not a statutory labor
organization and was not acting as an agent for the national farm union of which it was a
part. 191 F.2d at 649.
38. 191 F.2d at 647-48.
39. 250 F.2d 332 (2d Cir. 1957).
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context.40 The local union in Bull was mixed, unlike the unit in Di
Giorgio, but all of the members involved in the dispute were super-
visors working for the same employer. While under the Di Giorgio
rationale, the mixed local would have been deemed a statutory labor
organization, the court of appeals reasoned that a narrower defini-
tion could be applied without contravening congressional intent4'
and held that the supervisors formed a nonemployee subgroup
which was not a statutory labor organization within the meaning of
section 2(5) of the Act.4" This decision was predicated on the court's
analysis of congressional intent behind the Taft-Hartley amend-
ments and the court's desire to avoid certain consequences that it
envisioned flowing from a contrary holding: "[I]f MEBA [were]
classified as a 'labor organization' for purposes of this action simply
because some of its members who [are] not within this bargaining
unit [are] statutory 'employees', then supervisors could gain the
protections of the Act by joining either vertically integrated unions
or unions which, in some parts of the country, represent nonsupervi-
sory personnel. This result was not intended by Congress." 3
Reconsidering the status of mixed unions under the Act in
40. The court held that the anti-strike injunction prohibition, Norris-LaGuardia Act, § 4,
29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970), was inapplicable to a nonstatutory labor organization. 250 F.2d at
338. See also United States v. National Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 294 F.2d 385, 390
(2d Cir. 1961).
41. 250 F.2d at 336. But see Pharmacists Local 330 v. Lake Hills Drug Co., 255 F. Supp.
910 (W.D. Wash. 1964) (holding the supervisors to be employees since the employer voluntar-
ily had recognized them as such for the purposes of previous bargaining).
42. The court did not discuss whether the local unit was acting as an agent for the national
organization.
43. 250 F.2d at 336 (footnote omitted). Including supervisor locals within the coverage of
the Act, however, would not necessarily have provided the benefits suggested in Bull. While
the organization would be protected, the individual supervisory members would not. The
supervisors would remain subject to discharge by management for union activities, and the
union's activities would be restricted by section 8(b). Section 8(a)(2) proscribes employer
interference "with the formation or administration of any labor organization," 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(2) (1970), but the remaining subsections of section 8(a) specifically protect "employ-
ees," not including supervisors. For a discussion of employer control over supervisors, see
Note, Union Discipline of Supervisors: Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 14 Ws. & MARY L. REV.
674 (1973).
Excluding supervisor locals of mixed national unions from the protections and restrictions
of the Act would divide more evenly the benefits aid burdens of the Act. The union would
not be protected organizationally, but the local could act against the employer without the
constraints of section 8(b). Employers would remain free to discharge, or to refuse to hire,
supervisors engaging in union activities. Such a balance, it is submitted, would more closely
resemble the objectives set forth by Congress in the legislative history. See 93 CONG. 1R1c. 3952
(1947) (remarks of Senator Taft), in 2 LEoISLATW HIsToRY 1008; S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. 5 (1947), in 1 LEoisLA rva HiSTony 411.
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National Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association v. NLRB,4 the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit nevertheless discarded the
analysis which it had proposed in Bull only three years earlier. The
Court reversed its prior position by holding that because section 2(3)
expressly did not limit its definition of "employee" to those working
for one employer and the legislative history did laot exclude conclu-
sively mixed unions from the scope of section 8(b), the union was a
statutory labor organization notwithstanding the local's exclusively
supervisory personnel membership."
The Di Giorgio decision was distinguished in Marine Engineers'
on the grounds that it had found no statutory labor organization to
exist where none of the local's members were employees under the
statute and the local had acted independently, not as an agent for
a national union. Although the court in Marine Engineers' implied
that an agency relationship existed, it did not base its decision on
a finding of agency, but held that the locals were labor organizations
because the national organizations included statutory employees
and because the activities of the locals induced nonmember statu-
tory employees to honor picket lines." Similarly, although the court
did not seem completely satisfied that all members of the local
union were supervisors, 4 it did not seek to utilize the Bull rationale
to accord nonlabor organization status to subgroups of nonemploy-
ees within a local union. Instead Bull was distinguished summarily
on the basis that it concerned a different section of the Act,48 an
unsatisfactory distinction since the finding that no labor organiza-
tion existed where a local was comprised solely of supervisors was
44. 274 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1960).
45. Id. at 173. MEBA and MM&P had joined with National Maritime Union (NMU) to
form another organization called Rivers Joint Organizing Committee (RJOC). When RJOC
initiated a strike and secondary boycott against a towing company, the towing company
settled. Later the NLRB ordered the cessation of the secondary boycott as an unfair labor
practice. NMU, and therefore also RJOC, had members who were statutory employees, but
all members of MEBA and MM&P who worked for the towing company were alleged to be
supervisors. MEBA and MM&P appealed the NLRB order claiming that, having no employee
members in the employ of the towing company, they were not labor organizations and thus
were not subject to the order. The court held that they were labor organizations nationally
and that the status of workers for the particular employer against whom the unfair labor
practice was committed was irrelevant to such a determination. Id. at 173-74.
46. Id. at 172-74.
47. Id. at 172-73.
48. Id. at 174. The section under which the court said Bull was decided is section 301(a)
of the Taft-Hartley Act, which gives federal district courts jurisdiction over "(s]uits for
violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization. . . ."29 U.S.C. § 185
(a) (1970). A determination that the section is applicable necessarily involves a finding that
a statutory labor organization exists.
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nonetheless crucial to the outcome in Bull." Had the court utilized
a Bull analysis, it could have found a subgroup of nonemployees
which would have been beyond the Act's prohibitions.
Marine Engineers' was cited as controlling authority by the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in a 1965 case also
concerning MM&P, International Organization of Masters, Mates
& Pilots v. NLRB, 5 which upheld a Board determination5 - that
picketing by a mixed union to protest a company's alleged discrimi-
nation in its selection of supervisors constituted an unfair labor
practice. Declining to accept the analysis presented in Bull, the
court found MM&P to be a statutory labor organization because it
could not justify following Bull without more guidance from the
legislative history and, more importantly, because application of
the agency test 52 it had announced in Di Giorgio resulted in a finding
that the local was acting on the national union's behalf.
At this juncture the status of mixed unions under the Act re-
mained unresolved since the courts of appeals had reached no agree-
ment regarding whether Congress intended mixed unions, or por-
tions thereof, to qualify for exclusion from the Act's coverage, and
if so, whether a court should focus on the national, the local, or a
subgroup consisting of the particular employer's workers when de-
termining each union's status on a case-by-case approach. Although
the Supreme Court in Hanna Mining Co. v. District 2, Marine Engi-
neers' Beneficial Association,;3 and the Court of Appeals for the'
Second Circuit in National Marine Engineers' Beneficial Associa-
tion v. Globe Seaways, Inc.54 subsequently were presented with op-
portunities to clarify this issue, neither provided a satisfactory solu-
tion. The holdings in these cases appeared to deviate from previous
decisions which had classified local MEBA affiliates as statutory
labor organizations because the national membership included sta-
tutory employees,5 utilizing a new approach under which the status
49. See notes 40, 48 supra.
50. 351 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
51. Chicago Calumet Stevedoring Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 116, 55 L.R.R.M. 1265 (1964).
52. Although the court advocated the application of a strict agency test in such situations,
it cautioned against using a test so strict as to encompass all activities by locals and suggested
instead that a case-by-case consideration of each of the factors indicating a local's status
would be appropriate. 351 F.2d at 777.
53. 382 U.S. 181 (1965).
54. 451 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971).
55. United States v. National Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 294 F.2d 385. (2d Cir. 1961);
National Marine Eng'rs, Beneficial Ass'n v. NLRB, 274 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1960). The Supreme
Court also had held MEBA to be a labor organization in Marine Eng'rs' Beneficial Ass'n v.
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of the local was determined solely from an examination of its own
membership.
Picketing by supervisors in danger of losing recognition as a bar-
gaining unit precipitated the Hanna dispute. Section 8(b)(1)(B) was
not involved, but the Court nevertheless deemed the question
whether the union was a statutory labor organization to be disposi-
tive.51 Noting that all of the engineers working for the employer were
supervisors, the Court bypassed examination of the national union'
and held that MEBA was not -to be considered a statutory labor
organization in this instance. Similarly, for the purposes of that
litigation,,8 the court of appeals in Globe Seaways deemed MEBA
not to be a statutory labor organization under section 2,,1 apparently
without inquiring into its national membership."0
In its 1973 Masters, Mates, & Pilots decision," when the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit again confronted a
question dependent upon the status of mixed unions, it was unable
to develop from extant decisions a practicable test. Employing the
rationale used by the Court of Appeals for-the Second Circuit in
Marine Engineers', the court focused on MM&P's national consti-
Interlake S.S. Co., 370 U.S. 173 (1962). There MEBA engaged in a secondary boycott for the
purpose of requiring the marine engineers of the company to become members of MEBA. In
determining that MEBA was a labor organization, the Court examined the legislative intent
of section 8(b)(4)(A) and found that it was intended to prohibit activity such as that in which
MEBA had engaged.
56. 382 U.S. at 188. The majority of the engineers employed by Hanna Mining Co. had
indicated that they did not support MEBA as their bargaining representative; Hanna at-
tempted to force an election and refused to deal with MEBA. Subsequent picketing by MEBA
led to attempts by Hanna in the NLRB regional offices to enjoin the picketing. Because the
NLRB determined the engineers to be supervisors, not employees, the engineers could not
be forced to hold a representation election or be restrained from picketing. The state courts
in Wisconsin also refused to restrain the picketing because they determined that the federal
law in the N.L.R.A. preempted state action in such cases. Hanna Mining Co. v. District 2,
Marine Eng'r Beneficial Ass'n, 23 Wis. 2d 433, 127 N.W.2d 393 (1964).
57. 382 U.S. at 190. The Court accepted the NLRB determination that the supervisors were
not employees without further analysis, but held that such picketing could be restrained by
state courts if violative of state law.
58. At issue was the validity of an arbitration agreement between MEBA and the employer.
451 F.2d at 1160.
59. 451 F.2d at 1160 n.1.
60. In support of its findings, the court noted that the NLRB regional office had refused
to issue a complaint against MEBA because the members involved wdre supervisors and not
statutory employees. The court did not, however, specify whether the national membership
had been considered in making its classification or whether it was assumed that the national
contained no employee members in light of the Board's actions.
61. International Org. of Masters, Mates & Pilots v. NLRB, 486 F.2d 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 1970 (1974).
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tuency as well as on the type of workers formerly employed on the
Floridian.2 The Supreme Court's decision in Hanna was distin-
guished on its facts because the picketing in Masters, Mates &
Pilots was designed to remove another union's officers and not to
determine a representative union as in Hanna.63
Application of Hanna or Di Giorgio could have cleared the waters
muddied by the Marine Engineers decision. Judge Bazeion's dissent
in Masters, Mates & Pilots strongly argued that the Hanna standard
should have been applied and that a supervisors union should not
be deemed a labor organization for the purposes of section
8(b)(1)(B) unless it also represented rank-and-file workers in the
hire of the supervisors' employer."4 He predicated his argument
upon an analysis of congressional intent behind the adoption of the
1947 Taft-Hartley amendments. Although his view might appear to
contradict the "plain meaning" of 8(b) (1) (B),"' the conflicting hold-
ings of the various courts reflected sufficient uncertainty in interpre-
tation to warrant his reexamination of legislative intent. Judge Ba-
zelon concluded that inasmuch as Congress intended section
8(b) (1) (B) to restrict the activities of employee unions, the standard
used to determine whether a supervisors local is guilty of an unfair
labor practice should complement this intention by not restricting
the activities of supervisor locals."
Union Discipline Cases: An Analogy
One characteristic of the various judicial attempts to determine
precisely when a mixed union may be a statutory labor organization
has been the continual search for a simple, mechanical test which
may be universally applied to each subsequent problem as it arises.
That the application of a simple test turning on the presence or
absence of a union member might not be the optimum approach to
labor problems is illustrated by the willingness of the courts to
examine the functional role played by supervisors in cases involving
union discipline.
Beginning with San Francisco-Oakland Mailers Union No. 18,
62. See notes 25-28 supra & accompanying text.
63. 486 F.2d at 1275 n.3.
64. Id. at 1278.
65. Judge Bazelon emphasized that the doctrine that a rule might be within the letter of a
statute and yet not within its spirit has particular force in labor legislation. 486 F.2d at 1276.
See notes 29-34 supra & accompanying text.
66. 486 F.2d at 1276-79.
67. 172 N.L.R.B. 2173, 69 L.RIR.M. 1157 (1968).
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the Board and the courts have extended the application of section
8(b) (1) (B) to restrict fines and other disciplinary measures imposed
on supervisor members by their unions when such union discipline
interferes with the employer's absolute control over its representa-
tives." In Oakland Mailers foremen were fined by the union for
failure to comply with an order to appear before the union's execu-
tive committee. According to the trial examiner, the continued ex-
istence 6f such a procedure would have raised the possibility of its
being used against a foreman if the executive committee were to
disagree with his interpretation of an existing bargaining agree-
ment. Since this possibility presented a potential interference with
the foreman's obligations as the employer's representative, the
union's purpose was found to be restraint and coercion of the em-
ployer in his selection of foremen. The NLRB agreed with the trial
examiner, holding that this disciplinary procedure was "designed to
change the [company's] representatives from persons representing
the viewpoint of management to persons responsive or subservient
to [the union's] will."6 Nevertheless, it explicitly recognized that
not all union discipline of supervisors would violate section
8(b)(1)(B), 0 noting that the section was relevant in that case only
because the supervisors in question participated in interpreting the
collective bargaining agreement."1
In Oakland Mailers the Board stressed the particular role of the
supervisor that the union activity was intended to influence, but it
did not explain how a role thus affected was to be determined.
Dealing with a similar question in Meat Cutters Local 81 v. NLRB,72
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit suggested
that a supervisor with collective bargaining responsibilities was pro-
tected by section 8(b)(1)(B) from union discipline for acts per-
formed in the course of management duties or when exercising man-
agerial authority.7 3 The interest the union attempted to affect, said
68. See, e.g., NLRB v. Lithographers Locals 15-P & 272, 437 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1971).
69. 172 N.L.R.B. at 2174, 69 L.R.R.M. at 1159.
70. See NLRB v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967). In Oakland Mailers, the
Board distinguished Allis Chalmers because it concerned an 8(b)(1)(A) violation and because
it primarily concerned the relationship between a union and its members. NLRB v. Sheet
Metal Workers Local 361, 477 F.2d 675, 677 (5th Cir. 1973), specified that union discipline of
supervisors is permissible only in a "purely internal union matter."
71. 172 N.L.R.B. at 2174, 69 L.R.R.M. at 1159.
72. 458 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
73. ' To hold to the contrary would be tantamount to depriving management of the power
to manage." Id. at 800.
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the court, must be within definite, although broad, limits in order
to constitute an unfair labor practice.
Confronted with a similar union fine case in International Broth-
erhood of Electrical Workers v. NLRB,74 the same court distin-
guished Meat Cutters, finding the underlying dispute to be "not one
of contract interpretation, but simply a lawful economic strike
against the company to get a better contract." 5 Because the super-
visors were fined only for having performed rank-and-file work dur-
ing the course of a strike, the object of the fines was not found to
touch the supervisors' representative capacity and, therefore, was
held not to constitute an unfair labor practice under section 8(b)
(1)(B). The court held that section 8(b)(1)(B), as interpreted in
Oakland Mailers and Meat Cutters, immunized supervisors "from
union discipline imposed for the manner in which they performed
their supervisory functions" 5 but not for other matters.
Affirming the court of appeals, the Supreme Court further con-
strained the application of section 8(b)(1)(B), determining that
under section 8(b)(1)(B) union discipline would be prohibited only
when it deleteriously affected the supervisor's performance of collec-
tive bargaining or grievance adjustment duties.77 Since the imposi-
tion of disciplinary measures on supervisor members for performing
rank-and-file work during an economic strike could not be deemed
union coercion in the employer's selection of collective bargaining
or grievance adjustment representatives, the Court held that the
IBEW had not committed an unfair labor practice under section
8(b)(1)(B). The undivided loyalty of such representatives to their
employers is preserved "by reserving in [the employer] the right
74. 487 F.2d 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1973), aff'd sub nom. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Electrical
Workers Local 641, 94 S. Ct. 2737 (1974).
75. Id. at 1158.
76. Id. at 1170.
77. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Electrical Workers Local 641, 94 S. Ct. 2737 (1974). The
Court concluded:
Both the language and the legislative history of § 8(b)(1)(B) reflect a clearly
[focused] congressional concern with the protection of employers in the selec-
tion of representatives to engage in two particular and explicitly stated activi-
ties, namely collective bargaining and the adjustment of grievances. By its
terms, the statute proscribes only union restraint or coercion of an employer "in
the selection of his representatives for purposes of collective bargaining or ad-
justment of grievances," and the legislative history makes clear that in enacting
the provision Congress was exclusively concerned with union attempts to dictate
to employers who would represent them in collective bargaining and grievance
adjustment.
Id. at 2744.
1974]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
to refuse to hire union members as supervisors""8 under section
14(a).
Clearly, the prohibitions of section 8(b)(1)(B) do not extend to a
supervisor who is not also a representative; it is submitted that,
pursuant to a similar analysis, the section is inapplicable when a
mixed union attempts to influence the selection of a supervisor for
reasons not related to the representative functions performed by the
supervisor. Prior to restricting the availability to supervisors of
traditional self-help remedies, the courts should utilize the investi-
gative approach approved by the Supreme Court for the union disci-
pline decisions. An investigative evaluation should be directed at
the objectives underlying each particular self-help activity to ascer-
tain whether it is intended to coerce the employer's selection of his
collective bargaining and grievance adjusting representatives. Con-
gress has sought only to prohibit unions from coercing employers
into selecting pro-union representatives, not to proscribe every ef-
fort made by mixed unions on behalf of their supervisory members."
For example, in the second Masters, Mates & Pilots case, it was
clear that the picketing deck officers had functioned as bargaining
representatives aboard the Floridian, but the activities directed
against management were self-help efforts designed only to achieve
reinstatement, not activities designed to effect a change in any man-
agement choice of supervisors. Thus the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, aware of the supervisors' purposes,
could have held no section 8(b)(1)(B) violation to exist had it ap-
plied either its own agency test or the Bull rationale that if only
supervisors participate, there is no coercion by statutory employ-
ees.8' A holding that no violation was present pursuant to either
78. Id. at 2746.
79. By limiting the application of section 8(b)(1)(B) in Electrical Workers to instances
where the disciplinary measures touched on the supervisor's duties in collective bargaining
or grievance adjustment, the Supreme Court implied that it would not countenance further
extension of the Oakland Mailers doctrine to invoke the section whenever any type of supervi-
sory duty might be affected by union action. Id. at 2742-45. Cf. Note, Union Discipline of
Supervisors: Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 14 WM. & MAv L. Rav. 674, 685 (1973).
80. See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1947), in 1 LEOisLATMvn HISToRY 407; 93
CONG. REc. 4266 (1947) (remarks of Senator Ellender), in 2 LEGISLATVE HSTORY 1077; 93
CONG. Ic. 2378 (1947) (remarks of Senator Ball), in 2 LEGisLATIv HISTORY 1524-25. Cf. 93
CONG. REc. 3953 (1947) (remarks by Senator Taft), in 2 LEGiSLATIVE HMSTORY 1012.
81. Cf. Madden v. International Org. of Masters, Mates & Pilots, 166 F. Supp. 862 (N.D.
Ill. 1958), supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law vacated on a procedural
ground, 264 F.2d 169 (7th Cir.,), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 931 (1959). Madden involved picketing
by members of an MM&P local comprised exclusively of 'supervisors for the purpose of an
offer of reinstatement. The district court held that the local was not a statutory labor organi-
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theory would not contravene the congressional intent behind section
8(b)(1)(B). By denying certiorari in Masters, Mates & Pilots, the
Supreme Court missed an opportunity to lend to the self-help cases
the analytical guidance it gave the union discipline decisions in
Electrical Workers.
A PROPOSED METHOD OF ANALYSIS
As has been indicated, the circuit court in Masters, Mates &
Pilots is not the first to flounder when applying the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, particularly section 8(b) (1) (B), to the activities
of mixed unions. It should be apparent that this difficulty is attrib-
utable in part to the wording of the statute and in part to the
absence of a reliable method for determining when an application
of the statute to a mixed union furthers the intent of Congress
expressed in section 8(b) (1) (B). To avoid the "extraordinary result"
of having a literal application of this section defeat its purpose, the
following method of analysis is suggested.
The initial step should be an examination of the national union's
membership. If the national union has no statutory employee mem-
bers, then it does not qualify as a statutory labor organization, and
there is thus no entity which can be guilty of an unfair labor practice
within the meaning of section 8(b)(1)(B). Whenever statutory
employees appear on the national's membership rolls, however, the
court should investigate the membership of the relevant local union
and the purpose behind the actions taken.
Local unions comprised solely of supervisory personnel should be
subjected to the agency test applied in Di Giorgio. If, as in Di
Giorgio, the local is found to be acting solely in its own behalf, and
if the purpose underlying its actions does not run counter to the
intent of Congress that employers should not be coerced in their
selection of supervisors as management representatives, then the
local should be exculpated from any unfair labor practice allega-
tions. 2 Conversely, if the local is acting as an agent of its national
affiliate in the dispute, it should be deemed a statutory labor organi-
zation and held subject to section 8(b)(1)(B) despite the absence of
statutory employees in the local.
zation in the absence of employee members and that it was not acting as an agent of any
labor organization. Therefore, the court concluded that the picketing by its members was not
violative of section 8(b)(4)(A).
82. Even if the supervisors are attempting to influence the employers in their choice of a
representative to deal gratuitously with the supervisor local, the Act should not interfere since
the employers can resort to traditional remedies.
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The involvement of a mixed local requires a court to ascertain the
status of all members in the dispute and poses a greater possibility
that the members resorting to self-help remedies are pursuing im-
proper objectives. If all local members invoking self-help remedies
against a single employer are supervisors and act without seeking
to benefit the local unit's statutory employee element in any way,
then the Bull rationale should be employed to hold this subgroup
within a mixed local not to be a statutory labor organization for the
purposes of the dispute. Such a holding would not frustrate the
congressional intent behind section 8(b) (1) (B), so long as the activi-
ties in question were true self-help actions designed to benefit only
the participating supervisors.13
Application of this proposed method of analysis to the facts in the
second Masters, Mates & Pilots decision, for example, would have
resulted in a finding that the picketing by the Floridian's former
officers constituted permissible self-help activities rather than a
violation of section 8(b)(1)(B) because there was no mixed local, no
agency relationship between the local and the national, and the
objectives of the self-help activity were unrelated to the bargaining
process between management and statutory employees. It is sub-
mitted that this method of analysis 84 would not only remove the
threat to supervisor self-help remedies posed by Masters, Mates &
Pilots and Marine Engineers', but it also would serve to effectuate
the intent of Congress in section 8(b) by providing a consistency of
holdings that could avoid a source of instability and unpredicta-
bility in labor-management relations.
83. Nevertheless, if the supervisors attempt primarily to affect management's choice of a
representative to deal with statutory employees within the mixed local, the subgroup must
be deemed to be acting on behalf of the entire mixed local and their activities construed to
be within the purview of the Act under agency concepts.
84. This proposal may be criticized in that its application is more difficult than that of
the court in Masters, Mates &Pilots. Perhaps the most appropriate response to such criticism
was framed by Justice Brennan in his consideration of an ambiguous application of section
8(b): "This will not always be a simple test to apply. But '[h]owever difficult the drawing
of the lines more nice than obvious, the statute compels the task.'" Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n
v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 645 (1967) (interpreting section 8(b)(4)(A)), quoting Electrical Work-
ers Local 761 v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 674 (1961).
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